

Reflection and Self-Deception

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I want to discuss some issues which I think arise regarding the role of reflective consciousness in self-deception,¹ as Sartre treats these in *Being and Nothingness*. Although I will be developing some criticisms of Sartre, these will be from within a viewpoint basically sympathetic to *Being and Nothingness*, and the answers I suggest are basically Sartrean answers. I shall also have occasion to discuss (again, sympathetically) views held by Herbert Fingarette in his book *Self-Deception*. It will be convenient for me to suppose that the French term *mauvaise foi* can acceptably be translated as "self-deception" as well as the more literal "bad faith." I am aware that there is debate on this point; it is not a debate I wish to enter here.

Contributions to an analysis of self-deception can be found throughout *Being and Nothingness*. Three of the most important and sustained discussions and the general points I want to extract from them are as follows:

(1) Toward the end of the chapter on "The Origin of Negation" Sartre discusses how we may attempt to flee from anguish, which is "the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself."² We may flee from this reflection by means of reflection. Sartre refers to this as a process of "distraction" and "detachment."³ "Thus we flee from anguish by attempting to apprehend ourselves from without as an Other or as a *thing*."⁴ We may seek to flee our future by taking refuge in our pasts, or try to flee our pasts by capitalizing on our having a free future. Both take place on the level of reflection.

(2) In the chapter entitled "Bad Faith" we learn that self-deception is made possible through our exploiting certain ambiguities in the nature of consciousness. One of these is the facticity-transcendence ambiguity. The flirtatious woman may emphasize the more immediate and factual dimension of her holding hands with her companion, so as to affirm that she is merely holding hands, and de-emphasize the more threatening implication of this action, which is that she is a party to being flirtatious. Or she might emphasize the transcendent implications of what she is doing—namely, having a conversation—so as to de-emphasize the fact that she is holding hands. Another ambiguity exploited by the self-deceiver is derived from the difference between one's own point of view on one's actions and the point of view of another.⁵ Given the role that others may see us in, one can play at being what one is seen as being, but one cannot simply be it. There are two reasons for this, which I will want to sort out later: (a) The very fact that one is aiming at being something implies that one is conscious of not being that thing; (b) as soon as one reflects upon what one is, one is other than the object of one's consciousness. Therefore one cannot state "sincerely" what one is. For both of these reasons, supposedly, it is impossible to sincerely represent oneself. And this impossibility is exploited when one takes on the attitude that it would be pointless to attempt to represent oneself honestly on the grounds that one could not be sincere in any case. This is used to distract ourselves from specific insincerities.

To tap just one more point from this chapter, Sartre tells us that bad faith is not entered into with a reflective and voluntary decision, not by an explicit and deliberated choice, but is a "spontaneous determination of our being."⁶

(3) In the first chapter of Part IV there is yet another sustained discussion of bad faith. In explaining how a person on a hike may be responsible for being fatigued, Sartre mentions that there is a kind of reflective consciousness which is directed upon one's fatigue "in order to live it and to confer on it a value and a practical relation to myself."⁷ So here is a "type of flight before facticity, a flight which consists precisely in abandoning oneself to this facticity."⁸ Such behavior patterns Sartre terms "abandon." It will be convenient for me to label this phenomenon "immersion."

The larger point that Sartre presses in this part of *Being and Nothingness*, suggested by the earlier "spontaneous determination of our being" language, is that reflective consciousness is itself a project which is to be understood in the wider context of pursuits of unreflective

consciousness. For example, if one chooses to pursue what is sometimes called an "inferiority complex" then one's "reflections" will serve that project. One will "reflect" that one wants to succeed, and the point of this will be to intensify one's sense of failure. "Even if I dream of getting out of [this inferiority complex], the precise function of this dream is to make me experience even further the abjection of my state: it can be interpreted therefore only in and through the intention which makes me inferior."⁹ Here the large thesis is that self-deception is possible because we can pursue projects consciously but unreflectively, and that what we reflect on ourselves as being will itself just be one of several things we do which illustrate a broader project. So a central claim of later portions of *Being and Nothingness* is that self-deception is possible because of the nature of unreflective consciousness, which can involve projects one only selectively and strategically reflects upon. Here "reflection" means something like "explicitly think about." The central thesis of the earlier portions of *Being and Nothingness* is that ambiguities inherent in reflective consciousness, make self-deception possible. The connection between the earlier and the later theses (which are not at all as neatly sorted out as the way I am putting this may suggest) is that self-deception often operates on the level of reflective consciousness, but that this, in turn, needs to be understood in terms of broader and unreflective commitments. In ordinary language this means that we may deceive ourselves in and by being explicitly conscious of something about ourselves which we want to avoid dealing with, making that matter the object of consciousness, and in so doing, manage to evade it. And this ability is connected with skills and commitments we have which we probably do not make the object of explicit consciousness.

Throughout *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre consistently maintains that self-deception is possible because of the nature and inherent ambiguity of consciousness. Sometimes the suggestion is that it is reflective consciousness which makes self-deception possible. Other times the suggestion is that self-deception is made possible by the nature of unreflective consciousness, with reflective consciousness being but one means to this.

In his book on *Self-Deception*, Herbert Fingarette¹⁰ asks us to consider *why* anyone should seek to self-deceive. That question takes on a fresh and engaging forcefulness from within the analysis of self-deception that Fingarette's book details. According to that analysis, the self-deceiver is someone who has a certain "engagement in the world" which he will not "spell out." "Spelling out something" is an activity of

making something explicit in a clearly and fully elaborated way. As an alternative to the expression "becoming conscious of something," Fingarette says, "the phrase 'spelling out' may refer, but need not, to the actual and elaborate saying out loud, or writing down, of that which one is becoming conscious of. [It] is intended to suggest strongly an activity which has a close relation and analogy to linguistic activity."¹¹ Equipped with this terminology, and with the emphasis on what a person may have a policy of not putting into words, Fingarette leads us to consider just what it is that is supposedly so risky about someone's thinking about what he is doing in this linguistically explicit and "spelled out" way. What is it about *words*, about explicitly *saying* something about ourselves, that can be so threatening? "[W]hat's in a word?"¹²

Why, indeed, should it be so hard for us at times to come right out and say things? What might it be about the spoken word that could account for the familiar fact that, even when we are alone, there are things we may have thought which we would be afraid to speak aloud?

Having posed this question, let us raise a related question for Sartre. According to Sartre, the point of self-deception is to flee from anguish. Anguish is "the reflective apprehension of freedom by itself."¹³ It is this freedom, which I am, which I seek to flee in self-deception; in other words, self-deception is a flight from this freedom which I am. We recall that for Sartre consciousness—including reflective consciousness—is always other than its object. It is this intentional structure of consciousness which allows Sartre to claim that sincerity is impossible, and which is the key to many of his assertions about self-deception: one can flee from dealing with something in and by reflecting on it, since one is, thereby, other than what one is consciousness of. But then it would seem that I cannot be the being I reflect on. "I can make no pronouncement on myself which has not already become false at the moment when I pronounce it."¹⁴ In that case, it is hard to see just what the risk could be in reflecting on myself, or in commenting on myself; on the contrary, I would automatically become other than, and alienated from, the object of this reflective comment, and thereby would have succeeded in fleeing anything about it which I wished to flee. In making myself conscious of it, I "negate" and "transcend" it. I cannot be what I reflect on being, because it is wholly other than I. Now we have taken a different turn with wondering why commenting about ourselves should be threatening. Since the for-itself cannot, itself, be an object of consciousness, we are left wondering what, precisely, the object of reflective consciousness might be. It might be what I have been: I may want to flee from the

implications of what I have done. It might be what I could become, my possibilities for the future. But it does not seem that it could touch who I presently am: it does not seem that my (present) freedom can be an object for me. So it is unclear what Sartre thinks I could "apprehend" or want to avoid apprehending. And even passing over this difficulty, it would seem that if it is this reflective apprehension of freedom that I wish to escape, reflective consciousness, by virtue of being other than its object, ought to be an asset rather than a threat.

Of course these are Sartre's own points that I am raising in objection to him. Sartre tells us that self-deception "is possible because sincerity is conscious of missing its mark."¹⁵ The unclarity arises, I think, because Sartre has not sorted out two reasons why the "mark might be missed." One reason is that the intentionality of consciousness entails a sort of alienation, whereby consciousness is other than its object by virtue of being consciousness *of* it. The other is that intentional action, which Sartre is prepared to equate with unreflective consciousness, is other than the "me" it implicitly aims at realizing, and this by virtue of the fact that I aim at it. It is this second theme which enables Sartre to portray a waiter as being in self-deception when he *plays at* being a waiter, whose conduct is artificial because it is "a little too precise, a little too rapid."¹⁶ There is a difference between my not being such-and-such because I reflect on being it, and not being a such-and-such because I aim at being it. These are easy to confuse, and it is understandable that Sartre at times runs them together, especially in a case like that of the waiter, which might involve both.

Usually, Sartre tells us, the for-itself is consciousness *of* a situation in the world, and only tacitly consciousness of itself. To highlight the fact that, here, consciousness does not have itself as an object and yet involves a sort of tacit recognition of itself, Sartre expresses this as "consciousness (of) itself." (For example, when I reach for something on my desk, I am by implication consciousness (of) where my hand is in relation to the object: it is the item on the desk, and not my hand, which is the object of consciousness). By contrast, in reflective consciousness, the parentheses around the "of" are removed. "Reflection" is defined as "the for-itself conscious *of* itself."¹⁷ Here the problem I am noting is this: if the for-itself is other than what it is consciousness of, it cannot be the for-itself which consciousness is "of" in reflection. Again, it is not clear to me what reflective consciousness might flee. The objections come from noting that it is unclear what it is to be the object of reflective consciousness, and unclear what the risk is in reflecting on one's (whose?)

being free. If I cannot apprehend what I *am*, why bother to feel such an apprehension?

Let me introduce some further distinctions which may be of help. To begin with, we need to distinguish consciousness which I call "affectively detaching" from consciousness which I shall call "affectively immersing." By "detachment I wish to capture a familiar phenomenon which may be characterized as dispassionate, removed, emotionally uninvolved, alienated, "out of touch." In contrast, "immersive" consciousness may be characterized in terms of being (feeling) involved, "caught up" or "swept up in," "in touch with." Earlier I linked this sort of "immersion" with what Sartre called "abandoning oneself to facticity." Now suppose it is my aim to be detached with respect to some issue, to make myself as unconcerned and unaffected as I can by something which I, none the less, wish to go through the motions of acknowledging. Perhaps this inherently involves playing the role of another person who is uninvolved and unconcerned. But then my alienation is not simply because I am automatically other than the "self" of which I am conscious; it is because I aim at a role and a mode of consciousness which is qualitatively detached. On the other hand, suppose there is some affective character which I seek to appropriate, into which I would "immerse" myself. Here, although perhaps it may be true that I am not this in so far as I am aiming at realizing it, surely I can with some success aim at immersing myself in this (rather than detaching myself from it). For example, suppose I say I am sad. Sartre argues that such emotions are chosen. "Moreover is not this sadness itself a *conduct*? Is it not consciousness which affects itself with sadness as a magical recourse against a situation too urgent? And in this case even, should we not say that being sad means first to make oneself sad?"¹⁸ If I were to say that I am sad in connection with trying to make a report about myself on the basis of a point of view which could just as well be occupied by another, then in that detached report I am other than what I report about, so that it is on those grounds (of affective alienation or detachment) that I am other than what I report about, and false that I am sad. Then I have engaged myself in the doing of something different from being sad, namely making an outsider's report. On the other hand, if I say I am sad in a way which abandons me to a project of sadness, if I say it in a way which immerses me in a project of being sad, then maybe I am not sad with respect to the fact that I am aiming at being sad, but at least it would be mistaken to describe me as being detached.

Next, we should try to distinguish between "reflective consciousness"

and what I would prefer to call "explicit consciousness." What I mean by "explicit consciousness" is paradigmatically linguistic in character. Whether the speech is audible or "silent" does not matter for my present purposes. If I say, "That flower is a rose," I am explicitly conscious of the flower and its kind. If I say, "I'm trying to reach that book," I am explicitly conscious of something (whether it is me or the book is not yet clear). I presume that people can be conscious of aspects of the world or themselves without this being made (linguistically) explicit. More to the point, surely it is possible to be explicitly conscious of something without this entailing that one has made an object of oneself, i.e., without this being, necessarily, an instance of reflective consciousness. (Saying, "That flower is a rose" is not an instance of reflective consciousness.) So reflective consciousness and explicit consciousness are not the same. Most important, remarks which have the surface grammar of being about oneself often do not, in fact, seek to make an object of oneself, and often do not represent the detached point of view of another. One's sadness can be explicitly conscious without being the object of explicit consciousness. Thus the words "I am sad" or "I am in pain" or "I love you" are to be compared with characteristically *immersing* behaviors, like frowning, saying "ouch," or giving a caress; they need not be examples of reflective consciousness but easily could be mistaken for that. Here, as Wittgenstein put it, "My own relation to my words is wholly different from other people's."¹⁹ These words are ways of engaging ourselves more fully in projects we aim at being. They need be neither detaching nor objectifying nor reflective. Hence it is possible to say "I am sad" with sincerity and without automatic alienation. This is precisely because such an explicit expression of sadness is not (or need not be) a reflective report.

When Sartre says that sincerity is impossible he seems to confuse the contention that (a) one fails to be what one says in so far as saying aims at being, with (b) one ceases to be what one says in so far as one turns to playing at being another who is giving a detached report about oneself. If I say "I am sad" in order to immerse myself into my project of sadness, trying to appropriate and be consumed by that sadness "factically," then Sartre can argue that I am not what I aim at in so far as I am engaged in aiming at it. That is a reason for claiming that the utterance is less than a "true report about me," but it is misleading to suppose that the utterance was *supposed* to be a report about me. In spite of the surface appearance, it would be more correct to hold that the "object" of this explicit consciousness is, indeed, not *me* but something in the world about which I constitute myself as sad. Then, even were we to grant it to Sartre that

detachment goes hand in hand with making oneself the object of reflective (and explicit) consciousness, it would not necessarily follow that I am either reflectively conscious or affectively detached when I say "I am sad."

By the same reasoning, when I say "I love you" I may indeed be sincere, provided that the saying fits with what I aim at, and provided that the saying is not a matter of detachedly making an object of myself. If when I say "I love you," the object of my consciousness is *you*, then what I say may be sincere. If I am the object of my explicit consciousness when I say this, and if I am affectively detached when I say it, then presumably my utterance is insincere on the grounds of detachment. We are familiar with instances in which this transformation from engagement to alienating reflection takes place. Sally spontaneously and unselfconsciously says to John, "I love you." But John is uncomfortable with this verbal caress, and turns the focus back on Sally by replying, "It's hard for me to believe you. What makes you so sure you love me?" Sally, thrown back on herself and challenged to give reasons, now sounds less convincing, and her voice seems flat and artificial. She says, "Well, I enjoy the things we do together. And I think we've got a lot in common." But now her words ring hollow not simply because she is playing at being in love, but because she has followed John's invitation to make an object of herself.

So: not everything that looks like reflective consciousness is indeed reflective consciousness. The converse of this point is worth noting as well. In spite of the fact that my remarks make no explicit mention of myself, we might want to characterize me as seeking to objectify myself and seeking to make myself the object of reflective consciousness. Thus I may be lecturing to my students on a topic having nothing to do with myself, yet be principally concerned with whether I am an interesting lecturer. That is what we would ordinarily call being self-conscious, and it captures the sort of alienation Sartre thinks is characteristic of reflective consciousness.

Having noted difficulties in Sartre's account of what we flee when we deceive ourselves, a recast Sartrean position may now be stated as follows: Self-deception is basically an *unreflective* flight from an *unreflective* consciousness of one's own freedom. Although this flight often takes the form of a distracting explicit consciousness which evades by inappropriate detachment or inappropriate immersion, this exploitation of explicit consciousness is a means to an end which is rooted in an underlying unreflective project of flight. It must be one's unreflective

consciousness of freedom that one flees, since there would be no point to fleeing from a reflective consciousness in which one was already detached.

And yet, having said this, it still seems to me that some of the "Why bother?" question remains. Sartre would hold that one could not attain so much as a semblance of escape from our unreflective consciousness of freedom. Perhaps we might have comprehended, and hence might have striven for, evading reflection. We could strive to evade some particular form or topic of reflection. Equally, we could strive to evade making something explicit, even if why we should do so has not yet been explained. But there is presumably no way we could even attempt to preserve our existence as unreflective consciousness while ridding ourselves of the freedom which constitutes it. Why bother to flee what we can't flee? How could anyone be said to be trying to flee freedom if nobody could have any idea how to do it?

I am not confident that I can answer these questions, but shall conclude with some suggestions which may make a contribution.

In the first place, it seems to me that self-deception is importantly connected with fleeing from making some matters explicitly conscious. But if we are to stick with this hunch, we must do so cautiously. We have already noted that persons can deceive themselves about a matter of which they are explicitly conscious, and, indeed, do so in and by being explicitly conscious of that matter. So a flight from explicit consciousness cannot be the whole story. I think distinguishing explicit consciousness from reflective consciousness provides part of what we need to untangle the problems here.

Secondly, I think we should want to retain Sartre's suggestion that self-deception connects with some sort of "apprehension" of our freedom which he also describes as "anxiety." Here I am least sure of what to say next, since I have already argued that it will not do to say we flee from an unreflective consciousness of our freedom, and neither will it do to say we flee a consciousness of freedom which is reflective, explicit, and detached (there being no point to doing so). Sartre's notion of reflective consciousness is confusing for reasons above and beyond its being run together with explicit consciousness and detachment. Although it would cost Sartre's theory dearly, perhaps we will need to say that an "apprehension" of freedom (anxiety) is neither an unreflective consciousness of freedom nor a detached reflective consciousness of freedom. Indeed, it seems to me that it is something in between, and I am not prepared to say just what.

Third, I think Fingarette's answer to the "Why bother?" question is

very helpful. Fingarette's answer builds on a theory that human identity is constructed through what he calls the making of "avowals." So the risk of "spelling-out" what one is doing is that one may jeopardize the identity one avows. The difficulty I have with this is that it portrays one's "identity" in a way which emphasizes what one "avows," whereas I side more with Sartre in seeing "identity" more in terms of what one *does*, what Fingarette calls "one's engagements in the world" (which need not coincide with the identity one avows).

In concrete experiential terms, I think one's flight from freedom comes down to a flight from the possibility of being different from how one is, and from an "apprehension" or anxiety associated with this. I shall have nothing further to say here about the nature of this anxiety. But I agree with Sartre's stressing that for human reality *being is reduced to doing*. So I shall portray the flight from freedom as a flight from some sort of *doing*. Now doing is always in a context, a situation. So I shall portray the self-deceiver as simultaneously fleeing the possibility of doing things differently, and fleeing situations which would invite him to do things differently. Now why should an explicit assessment of what one has been doing be risky? (1) It is liable to constitute one as other than what one has been, if entered in a manner which is affectively detaching. If this were necessarily affectively detaching, then one would avoid this simply because it would automatically render one as other than what one wanted to be. We have seen that this need not automatically be so, since explicit commentary can immerse as easily as it can detach. One may, however, equally flee immersing oneself in a mode of conduct that would constitute one as being different from how one has been. For example, I might flee from saying something angrily because I do not want to do what might constitute me as angry. I don't want to "lose my cool." (2) Explicit commentary on what one has been doing changes (adds to) one's situation. This, I think, is especially important. Once I have commented on myself, the fact that I have done so is a new fact in my history,²⁰ and hence a new component of my situation. My subsequent deeds will henceforth have this remark of mine as part of their setting. If I say I should stop smoking, if I say I have been deceiving myself, then my remarks are a fresh part of my world, hanging over me with the implied question, "And what are you going to do about it?"

If my explicit remarks are threatening because of what they could add to my situation, this does not mean that they might *cause* me to be (act) different. Sartre's central argument for freedom is that, "No factual state whatever it may be... is capable by itself of motivating any act whatsoever."²¹ This is because—to put it in my own words—my

situation depends upon me for its significance.²² I am not required to take my own explicit remarks seriously enough to act in ways I regard as "appropriate" with respect to them. We often do not choose to live up to the implied expectations of the explicit remarks *others* might make about us, and nothing requires us to act in keeping with the implications of our own remarks. Some people are notoriously indifferent about whether they do what they said they would do, and when they acknowledge something unsavory about themselves they may not feel the slightest commitment, subsequently, to doing anything differently in that regard. Most of us, however, seem to choose to be guided by some degree of "social appropriateness," so that having said "I'm being selfish" we feel ourselves to be in a situation in which it is more pressingly appropriate to do something differently.

In this regard, Fingarette makes the profound observation²³ that, unlike the "sociopathic personality," the "neurotic" and the self-deceiver have enough integrity to be concerned about discrepancies between their explicit remarks and their deeds.

So, I am accepting Sartre's analysis that self-deception is, in some manner, a flight from freedom; but I am arguing that this is, more precisely, a flight from being different from how one has been. Part of why there are some things we would flee from stating explicitly about ourselves is that by what I say I can change my situation, changing or highlighting what I will feel it is socially appropriate to do given what I have explicitly stated. This thesis is quite compatible with yet another thesis of Sartre's about self-deception, which may be extracted from his essay "Existentialism Is A Humanism,"²⁴ as well as the chapter in *Being and Nothingness* on "Concrete Relations With Others." For while there are some sorts of explicit comments we flee from, there are others that we cling to in the hopes of establishing for ourselves a static sort of "identity."²⁵ Sartre's famous slogan "existence precedes essence"²⁶ is a compressed way of saying that we run from our freedom when we try to hold that there are various "essential" features of our "natures" which are already fixed and settled. We take refuge in the fantasy that we have fixed essential character traits so as to flee from the prospect of being different from how we would like to think we have been. Note, by the way, that this means of self-deception would not be possible if we were always reflectively conscious of being other than what we comment on.

By way of conclusion, we may illustrate some of these points with Sartre's example of "the gambler who has freely and sincerely decided not to gamble any more and who when he approaches the gaming table,

suddenly sees all his resolutions melt away.²⁷ He will avoid situations which invite him to make explicitly conscious his possibility for gambling. If such situations do arise, he will try to take refuge in the facticity of his earlier resolutions: emphatically he says, "I don't gamble! I've already decided about this: no more gambling!" It is important that he immerse himself in this. For were he to review with detachment his earlier pronouncements, he would thereby remove himself from that resolute person. So it is risky for him to reflect, with detachment, "You still could join the game." Suppose he does reflect in this manner, and as he does so he senses, as he feared might happen, that his resolution dissolves. He lays down a bet. He was afraid that he could do this, and hence sought to immerse himself in an "identity" of one who had quit.

Now he is gambling. If we share Sartre's cynical side, we suspect that this man has gotten what he wants, but has become different from what he was explicitly committed to being. A crucial turning point for him was when he explicitly acknowledged that this was something he could do, because then that acknowledgement both detached him from his resolve, and added to a situation which he could construe as "inviting" him to gamble. Now that he is gambling, the dilemma has reversed in its form. He still *could* walk away. That, concretely, is what he is free to do, and it is that freedom to do something different which he now seeks to evade. So now he will not want to consider explicitly, "I am still at liberty to walk away from this and return to my earlier resolve." He wants to evade making this explicit because he wants to evade a situation he could construe as urging him to do it. Hence he wants to avoid any commentary which would detach him from his sense of being swept up in the activities of the table. He wants to avoid anything which could invite him to constitute himself as other than the gambler he now is. For him to comment "I could" is to invite the further comment, "Well, why don't I?" That sort of comment, in turn, invites him to act, to leave the game. And that, I think, is part of the answer to why it would be important to him to not say. One flees from explicitly taking the point of view of an other, because one flees from being other than who one is choosing to be.

NOTES

¹In revising an earlier draft of this paper I have profited greatly from extensive comments made by Professor Herbert Fingarette. The earlier draft was, in turn, derived

from section 4 of my article on "Saying, Feeling, And Self-Deception," which appeared in *Behaviorism: A Forum For Critical Discussion*, Spring 1978, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 27-43.

²Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* [B&N], Hazel Barnes translation, Philosophical Library, 1956.

³B&N, 41.

⁴B&N, 43.

⁵B&N, 57ff.

⁶B&N, 68.

⁷B&N, 454.

⁸B&N, 454.

⁹B&N, 475.

¹⁰Herbert Fingarette, *Self-Deception* [S-D], Humanities Press, 1969.

¹¹S-D, 39.

¹²S-D, 65.

¹³B&N, 39.

¹⁴B&N, 116.

¹⁵B&N, 150.

¹⁶B&N, 59.

¹⁷B&N, 150.

¹⁸B&N, 61.

¹⁹Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, G. E. M. Anscombe translation, Macmillan, 1953, page 192.

²⁰See Gilbert Ryle's discussion of "The Systematic Elusiveness of 'I,'" in *The Concept of Mind*, Barnes and Noble, 1949.

²¹B&N, 435.

²²See J. Michael Russell, "Sartre, Therapy, and Expanding the Concept of Responsibility," in *The American Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Fall 1978, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 259-269.

²³S-D, chapter 7.

²⁴Jean-Paul Sartre, "Existentialism Is A Humanism," in Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism From Dostoevsky To Sartre*, Meridian, 1975, pp. 345-369.

²⁵See J. Michael Russell, "Sartre's Theory of Sexuality," in the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, Spring 1979, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 35-45.

²⁶Sartre, "Existentialism Is A Humanism," *op. cit.*, 349.

²⁷B&N, 32.