The Journal of Mind and Behavior
Spring 1980, Vol. 1, No. I
Requests for reprints should be sent to J. Michael Russell, Ph.D.,
Department of
Philosophy, California State University, Fullerton, California
92634.
How to Think About Thinking:
A Preliminary Map
J. Michael Russell
California State University, Fullerton
I discuss three orientations to what the word "thinks" might mean,
the mentalist, the behavioral, and the avowal orientations, and
explain some variations of each. I urge that mapping out thinking in
this way allows us to examine some important issues that escape
us with more familiar theories (e.g., mind-brain identity theory, the
thesis of intentionality, etc.) and that these have important
implications for theorists in the social sciences. I argue that
psychological behaviorists often turn out to be philosophical
mentalists in disguise, and that a position of philosophical
behaviorism is profoundly different from the sort of behaviorism
familiar to psychologists.
In what follows I shall try to map out some ways to think about
what thinking is. By in large, what I have to say about thinking will
not be new to persons familiar with philosophical analysis in the
last thirty years, and I would like it to be comprehensible to
persons without such backgrounds. This will require that I consider
quite complex positions in a most abbreviated form. I draw a map
of territory covered by others, with the objective of orienting
newcomers to this topic, and of posting reminders for how to find
one's way about in an area where it is easy to become lost. I
would not want to give the impression that I am somehow
presenting in summary form a consensus which recent philosophers
have achieved on this topic; there is no such consensus. Rather, I
present a network of themes and variations which I believe should
be interesting and challenging to theorists in other fields. I will want
to show (in a paper yet to be written) how this map may be of use
to possible theories about the nature of psychotherapy, and will
offer some hints about this in the present text.
I shall concentrate on variations of three orientations to what
thinking is, and to what words like "thinking," "thinks," and
"thought" mean. Each has its merits and its weaknesses. One treats
thinking in terms of private mental events, inner processes or
occurrences or states. According to a second orientation, what it is
to think such-and-such is to have a tendency to behave in a certain
range of ways appropriate to the application of that term. And
according to a third orientation - a close cousin of the second - the
person who thinks such-and-such is the person who is prepared to
say that he or she thinks such-and-such.
Overview
The orientations to be considered may be dubbed, respectively,
the mentalist, the behavioral, and the avowal orientations. I speak
of "orientations" so as to indicate that I am speaking loosely of
various views which I regard as related; specific theorists may not
fall very neatly under these rough headings. However, among
traditional philosophers, Descartes and Locke stand out as
mentalists; probably most theorists and laypersons belong here.
Wittgenstein (1958 a, b) and Ryle (1949) are prominent figures
among a number of analytic philosophers who favor combinations
of the behavioral and avowal orientations. (It is extremely
important to note - for readers trained in the social sciences - that
the behavioral orientation of many philosophers differs profoundly
from what psychologists associate with the word "behaviorism.")
In my opinion, various existentialist, e.g., Sartre, fall more under
the behavioral than the mentalist heading; but this claim requires a
defense I shall not pursue here.
Each of these orientations prescribes an approach to what it means
to say that a person thinks such-and-such. They seek to identify
the criteria - and not merely the symptoms - for what the word
"thinks" means. For example, when we say of a particular man that
he thinks that it is raining outside, what does this expression mean?
According to the mentalist, the expression applies if (and only if)
this man has some relevant sort of process, state, or occurrence of
some--thing called (the relevant) "thought...... in his mind." But the
behaviorally oriented theorist, perhaps motivated by seeming
failures in the mentalist's position, will attempt to construe the
meaning of "that man thinks it is raining outside" in terms of the
man's behavior, and the variations in behavior which presumably
would be forthcoming depending on variations in circumstances.
Thus the person who thinks that it is raining will be - by virtue of
the (supposed) meaning of the expression - a person disposed to
doing such things as picking up an umbrella and overcoat when
going out of doors.
These dispositionally oriented analyses turn out to be indefinitely
complex "if ... then" conditional statements. If the man isn't just
returning the umbrella to a friend, and if he doesn't carry the
umbrella in the manner of someone oblivious to the rain, and if . . .
etc. (there may be an indefinitely long list of "ifs"), then he thinks
that it is raining. Or suppose he does not open the umbrella when
he is getting wet in the rain: then if we have reason to suppose he
wants his oversized pants to get soaked and shrink (presumably
this "he wants . . ." would also be analyzed in terms of relevant
behavioral dispositions), etc., then he's a man who thinks it is
raining. The idea is that these indefinitely complex descriptions of
what the man would do under various contingencies provide the
very meaning of the expression "he thinks it is raining".
Each of these orientations trades on the weaknesses of other
positions. It is a weakness of the behavioral position, it seems, that
no matter what the man does it will be possible for an imaginative
person to construe it in more than one way. Even a very
complicated description of how someone packs an umbrella after
looking out the window at the sky, etc., may seem to add up to
thinking that it is raining when some alternative account of what
they "really" think - even a bizzare or far-fetched alternative - is
available. Maybe the man "really" thinks that the umbrella will
serve to fend off the devils whose little feet (he thinks) can be
heard pattering along the sidewalk!
Since there can be such disputes about how to interpret a person's
behavior, the avowal oriented theorist siezes upon that which
settles disputes, and holds that it is this which provides the key to
the meaning of attributing a specific thought to a person. What the
man himself says he thinks is in fact what typically settles disputes.
So, according to this avowal orientation, the person who thinks it
is raining is one who, in addition to other relevant behavioral
dispositions, will say upon being questioned (and supposing there
is no deceit or error), "I think that it is raining." Having the
disposition to make such a (sincere) avowal, plus other relevant
behavioral dispositions, is supposed to provide the very meaning
of "thinks that it is raining." ("Sincerity" presumably must itself, in
turn, be analyzed into relevant behavioral dispositions.)
Meanwhile, the mentalist will claim it is obvious to "common sense"
that it is what goes on in the man's mind that makes all the
difference.
Connections with Other Theories
Before I begin to develop (and juggle) aspects of these
orientations, I want to urge that considering them will help us to
focus on some questions which other kinds of theories often fail to
bring out. For instance, they help us to see certain options in how
we may think about thinking which are not brought out by
"identity" theories. Theorists who argue for the prospect of
identifying thinking (and consciousness) with some brain process
are often unclear about just what it is that they are prepared to
identify with a brain process. For instance, if we were persuaded
that thinking it is raining outside may turn out to be identical with
some complicated neurophysiological happening in the brain, it
would still have to be made clear what we were identifying with
this brain process. Even pretending that we are clear enough about
what is meant by "brain process" and "identical with," it is not clear
enough just what is supposed to be identical with this brain
process. Is it a "mental occurrence"? Is it a complex behavioral
disposition? Is it a disposition to make certain linguistic avowals?
Prima facie, a mind-brain identity theory would be compatible with
any of these approaches to what thinking is. But we can't get far
trying to identify brain process with the condition of a person who
thinks such-and-such until we make an independent decision about
what we mean by saying a person thinks such-and-such.
There is a similar problem with the famous "thesis of intentionality."
According to this theory, it is essential and definitive of all mental
states, in contrast to all physical states, that they are "of" or "about"
or "directed toward" something. Supposedly, to have a thought or
belief or wish or intention is always to have a thought (etc.) about
something. The essential nature of the mental is that it has this
feature of "aboutness." Milk bottles and stones are not about
something, whereas thoughts are always thoughts about this or
that. Yet like the identity theory, this thesis of in-tentionality fails to
tell us what it is which supposedly has this feature of aboutness or
intentionality. Is it the mental event cited by the mentalist? Is
something inherent in the behavioral disposition? Is it a fact built
into the language of avowal?
Or again, consider the epiphenomenalist's theory. The
epiphenomenalist believes that our mental expressions (-hence
words like "thinks") refer to something which cannot be adequately
reduced to a description of the "merely physi-cal." So they admit
that when we say what a man thinks we discuss something
different from what is going on with his body. But, the
epiphenomenalist contends, this mental dimension is the mere
irrelevant by-product of the purely physical world. What we think
is entirely produced by the causally determined physical world,
and yet in turn exercises no real influence on that world. What we
think is a mere by-product, and like the steam escaping an engine,
it "turns no wheels." And yet for this theory there is once again the
question: What is it which is supposedly this mere by-product? Is it
the events cited by the mentalist? Is it our behavioral dispositions?
Is it what we would say about ourselves?
These last paragraphs should bring out the importance of the
orientations I have sketched, for they raise questions which cut
across more familiar theories about thinking.
Variations on the Mentalist Orientation
Theorists of this persuasion are liable to account for what it is for a
man to think that it is raining in terms of the "inner occurrence" of
something to be called "the thought that it is raining. " What sort of
occurrence? Traditional mentalists like Descartes will maintain that
we are all familiar in a "direct" way with the existence and nature of
our thoughts. But can anything further be said about the nature of
these? I can think of two main routes to try here. According to
one, mental occurrences are inherently unlike and irreducible to
anything resembling publicly witnessable events. For reasons which
will become evident, I will call this the non-analogue view.
Evidently it will be difficult to say much about such mental events;
one must resort to what are metaphors of an admittedly crude and
misleading sort in an effort to refer to something supposedly plain
to each of us in on our own "private" experience. Many people
seem to believe that this is the right sort of way to discuss the
nature of thinking; we are not to expect too much.
According to another route, mental occurrences are what I shall
call phenomenologically analogous to publicly witnessable
occurrences. Silently speaking on some matter is a
phenomenological analogue of talking about it aloud. Visually
imaging something is a phenomenological analogue of seeing it
happen in the public world. The mentalist may believe that thinking
it is raining consists in having relevant occurrences on the order of
silent speech or mental imagery. In contrast, the non-analogue
theorist may contend that such events as silent speech or visual
imagery are outgrowths of what it is to think that it is raining, and
believe that thinking this is a kind of occurrence, but not believe
that thinking is a kind of occurrence which resembles any familiar
public events.
What is sometimes used as an argument for the behaviorist
orientation may actually only indicate that something is wrong with
the orientation of the mentalist who wants to represent "thinking
that such-and-such" as consisting of events like mental imagery
which are phenomenologically analogous to events in the public
world. It is argued that thinking that it is raining cannot consist in
having a mental image of rain. For a person might have such an
image, yet the image not be "of" rain but "of" something which
"looked" similar, such as water from a hose, or slow moving drops
of glycerin from a chemical fountain. Or it might be that the person
indeed had the image of rain, but that this was part of an idle
day-dream and did not represent his belief (thought) that it was
raining outside. (Thinking of Aunt Tilly chewing bubble gum differs
from thinking that Aunt Tilly is chewing bubble gum.) It is a fact
that the having of a mental occurrence which is the analogue of
some public episode cannot be identified with what it is to think
that such-and-such is the case, for the reason that such events can
be construed variously in different circumstances. But someone
who subscribed to a non-analogue mentalism might maintain that
while images and words are ambiguous, what it is to think
something is not ambiguous.
Inner States
In my sketch of mentalism I have had to use the term "inner." The
term is used metaphorically, for it is not meant that thinking is
something which takes place in some locatable cavern. I believe
the point of using the word "inner" is to stress the idea that what a
person thinks is accessible only to that person in an "immediate"
way; to call it "inner" is to contrast it with publicly observable
behavior, with which it is only contingently connected. Others have
to take a person's word for it on what he or she thinks, or else
infer its existence "indirectly;" a person knows what he or she
thinks, while others can only guess.
In discussing the mentalist position I have been running together the
terms "mental occurrence" and "mental state." I must confess to
being unsure of what a mental state is supposed to be. Perhaps it is
a prolonged occurrence. So viewed, it would be something
ongoing, which might have begun sometime, and might end
sometime. In this sense a body of water might be said to be in a
frozen state. If a person's thinking that it is raining is said to be a
state, it is portrayed as a "something" which is "there" ("in the
mind") and such as will be "found" by an "introspective look". It
compares with how I shall find ice cubes in the refrigerator
whenever I happen to look.
A different rendering of the term "state" would come from treating
the idea of a mental state as the disposition for certain privately
accessible events called "thoughts" or called "having the thought
that it is raining" to take place (occur). On this view a woman who
truly thought it was raining would not necessarily have at a given
moment an ongoing event-like business of thinking that it was
raining. Perhaps the woman is having a nap - a dreamless nap - in
the belief that as it is raining there is nothing interesting to be done
with the afternoon. But when appropriate (and when awake,
presumably) she would hive whatever sort of occurrence (or
occurrences) which constitutes what it is to be thinking that it is
raining, and this would be of the sort that the mentalist claims.
A mentalist who gave dispositional analyses for "thinks" might
subscribe to either a public analogue view or a non-analogue view
of the nature of the occurrences or states in which thinking
supposedly consists. In either case, it seems not to have always
been recognized that a mentalist could employ the concept of a
disposition. One might have assumed (as I have tended to do in
the past) that this term was a tool only of use to the behavioral
theorist. However, maybe the concept of a disposition isn't as
interesting in a mentalist's- orientation as it is in a behavioral
orientation. For when the concept of a mental state is understood
in terms of there being a disposition for certain mental occurrences,
the really interesting constituents of these inner states are the inner
occurrences, and what we would like to have is a better portrayal
of them.
Objections to Mentalism
Why would anyone bother to reject mentalism? I have said that I
wanted this paper to be comprehensible to persons unfamiliar with
recent philosophical analysis, and such persons well may not see
why they should struggle with views which go so much against
what seems so plain to "common sense." Much of the intellectual
world is not yet even aware of the enormous amount of critical
philosophical discussion of this idea that each of us knows the
nature of thinking from an immediate access to our own inner lives.
Yet contemporary criticism of this idea may have the most serious
implications of any direction in recent philosophy. Here I must
confine myself to a very summary mention of some reasons for
questioning mentalism.
Here first is a phenomenological objection to mentalism. Theorists
of this orientation tend to maintain (perhaps unnecessarily) that our
thoughts exist within us in such a way that we are each aware of
the presence of our thoughts. Yet people who answer affirmatively
to the question "Do you think it is raining?" will not always allow
that when they answer such questions they do so by making
reference to an inner state or occurrence of which they are or were
aware. It just does not seem to be a simple fact of experience that
we are aware of thoughts within us which enable us to say what
we think.
Secondly, mentalists tend to hold (again, perhaps unnecessarily)
that our capacity to deal with the world intelligently is made
possible by our actions being preceded by the occurrence or
existence of our thoughts. Now as was just noted, it is less than
patent that experience bears this claim out. But anyway, as (Gilbert
Ryle (1949) has argued, such a claim tends to generate an absurd
"infinite regress." For consider the claim that before you could act
capably you must think about what you are doing. Thinking about
what you are doing is itself an activity which may or may not be
done well. So if it were true that before you could do something
well you had to think about it, it would also be true that before you
could think about it (or think about it well, i.e., carefully, capably)
you would have to think about thinking about it. And, in turn, you
would have to think about thinking about thinking about it. As
there is no end to this regress, there must be something absurd
about the assumption that generates it, namely, the idea that before
doing anything well you must think about doing it.
The preceding argument works against the notion that thinking is
something which precedes each and every act; a view generated
by the grammatical fact that one of the expressions we use for
indicating that we did something well is to say we thought about
what we were doing. Here is a more general criticism of
mentalism. The mentalist maintains that the meaning of "thinks" is
understood by each of us by reference to our own thoughts, and
that these are occurrences or states to which the person whose
thoughts these are has sole access. But if each of us knew only
from our own case what it is to think something, then we would
have no good reason to believe in, and indeed not even means to
comprehend the very idea of another person's thinking. The point
here is that we obviously do know what other people mean when
they say they think that it is raining, and yet we could not know this
if the mentalist's thesis about the meaning of "thinks" were correct.
It is often supposed that since other people have behavior
analogous to our own, we are entitled to infer in them the existence
of mental states or processes comparable to what supposedly we
each find within ourselves. But this argument from analogy is
untenable. Just suppose that there were something about
mailboxes which, on principle, made it utterly impossible for
anyone to ever inspect the contents of any mailbox but their own.
And suppose, one morning, that I open my mailbox and find
something in there which I call an "Easter egg." I dance with
excitement! Then I notice my neighbor dancing excitedly upon
having inspected his mailbox. Have I any reason whatsoever for
inferring, by virtue of our analogous behaviors, that he has
something in his mailbox which is similar to what I have found in
my own? Suppose I see similar behavior in everyone on my block,
and even suppose that each of them say that they have found
Easter eggs in their mailboxes. What is to prevent their mailboxes
from being quite different from my own, and their having frogs or
marbles or nothing at all? Clearly an inference from one case (my
own) to all cases yields a conclusion which is less than certain;
indeed, from a methodological standpoint, it would not even seem
warranted to say it is "probable" that others have similar contents
in their mailboxes. And if we are talking of "contents" in these
mailboxes which have the peculiar property that no one but their
owners can ever inspect them, then the conclusion of this argument
from analogy is worse than improbable - it is meaningless.
The argument against the possibility of a "private language" given
by Wittgenstein (1958b, paragraphs 241-281) provides a specific
and apparently devastating rebuttal to this idea that the meaning of
"thinks" could be provided by our individual familiarity with what
goes on within us when we think. Here is an abbreviated version of
this argument: The use of words in our language is taught. In order
to teach the use of words to a child, it must be possible to
distinguish between the cases where the child employs the term
correctly and where incorrectly. It would be impossible to
distinguish correct from incorrect use if using a term correctly were
a matter of linking the term with something to which only the
instructed and never the instructor had access. So, the use of the
word "think" is taught, and this requires instruction and correction.
Such instruction would be impossible if the word were to get its
meaning from referring to what the instructor could never have
access to "within" the instructed. And so the word "thinks" must
not refer in its meaning to this inaccessible something!
Varities of Behaviorism
This is not the place to discuss the (above) private language
argument in any sort of detail; it is sufficient if presenting it provides
reason for questioning the mentalist orientation (and the vast
amount of popular opinion and psychological theory which in one
or another form endorses a mentalist orientation) and looking for
alternatives. The behavioral orientation appears to provide a viable
alternative, since if the meaning of "thinks it is raining" consists in a
complex behavioral disposition then it appears possible to instruct
a person on using the language. The teacher can indicate the sorts
of behaviors to which the term "thinks" applies, and can check on
whether the child applies the term appropriately
What I have called the behavioral orientation need not be the same
as specific doctrines of behaviorism. It helps to distinguish
methodological from metaphysical behaviorism. The
methodological behaviorist believes that for the practical purposes
of doing empirical psychology scientists should confine themselves
to the variables to which they have access and over which they can
exercise control, these being overt behaviors. Methodological
behaviorists tend to be unclear about whether they are mentalists
who reject the importance of the inner mental life (we might call
such persons "pragmatic epiphenomenalists") or whether they
reject the very idea that there is the sort of mental life the mentalist
wants to talk about. The latter are metaphysical behaviorists. (In
psychology many theorists who identify themselves as behaviorists
are really mentalists in disguise - latent or closet mentalists -
because in refusing to incorporate words like "thinks" in their work
they tacitly assume that such words do indeed refer to inaccessible
private states.) The metaphysical behaviorist addresses himself or
herself to the question of the meaning of terms like "thinks" and
holds to some form of the view that the meaning of this term is a
matter of the behavior which "counts" for a case of thinking
(such-and-such). It is unfortunate that methodological behaviorists
are often blind to the theoretical avenues available to them if only
they become clear about where they want to stand on the issue of
metaphysical behaviorism. Some methodological behaviorists are
mentalist-enough that they believe that such terms as "thinks"
("wishes...... hopes," etc.) refer to private mental states, and then
metaphysical-behaviorist-enough to dismiss such notions as having
no significance. In this way it happens that behaviorally oriented
psychologists often have supposed that they must exclude from
their work considerations of what their subjects think (etc.), on the
uncritically assumed grounds that such mentalistic words refer to
something hidden. An available option would be to construe the
meaning of such terms via behavioral dispositions; then, in
principle, one might be able to include quite varied mentalistic
terminology within one's work and thereby utilize a richer and
more significant language. Maybe this utilization of everyday
mentalistic language is not feasible for the practical needs of the
psychological researcher; maybe the task of sorting out behavior
disposition criterion is just too cumbersome. But minimally, it
would behoove us to get clear about the reasons for the position
we take on this topic.
It may also prove valuable to distinguish hard-nosed from
soft-nosed metaphysical-behavioral orientations. The hard-nosed
variety will construe the meaning of "she thinks it is raining" as the
disposition to engage in standard sorts of publicly observable ways
which purportedly "count for" thinking that it is raining. The
soft-nosed behaviorist might be willing to include such non-public
occurrences as silent speech or mental imagery, but add that our
capacity to understand such occurrences as these, which happen
not to be publicly observable, is parasitic on our ability to
understand public occurrences of which these are analogues. I
know of no behaviorally oriented philosopher who is not soft
nosed in this sense. This seems to have been Wittgenstein's view,
since in the Philosophical Investigations he says that he does not
deny that there are inner processes, but then says, "An ''inner
process' stands in need of outward criteria" (1958b, paragraph
580). He also says, "Imagine people who could only think aloud.
(As there are people who can only read aloud)" (Paragraph 331).
I take this to mean that there are thought occurrences which
happen to be private but which could in principle be public. The
sense of "private" at issue in the "private language argument" is that
which is inherently and essentially private; the argument works
against identifying the meaning of a term with what is not in
principle public, since criterion for identifying whether a word is
working rightly can only be taught with respect to something which
is in principle publicly identifiable.
Then a metaphsical behaviorist may believe that a word like
"thinks" may range over occurrences such as silent speech or
mental imagery, but will maintain that the meaning of such terms
will be in some important way rooted in their application to public
life.
What then, is the difference between a soft-nosed behaviorist who
believes in mental occurrences like silent speech, and a mentalist
who believes that the mental occurrence of thinking something is
phenomenologically analogous to saying it aloud? I suppose it is
that the one believes that a term which gets its meaning from its
public application comes also to single out events which happen to
be (contingently) private, while the other believes that a term which
refers to what one initially knows from one's own case comes to
apply to behavior one observes in others.
Avowal Orientations
Human speech is, of course, a part of human behavior; so a view
which stresses the importance of what a person would avow (say
of oneself) will not be distinguishable in a very neat way from other
forms of behavioral orientations. However, the reasons for
considering avowals separately may be clearer when we recall the
reason for expressing behavior (as opposed to private mental
occurrences) in the first place. It was argued that if we identify the
meaning of "thinks" with privately having the occurrence of a
thought, it will always be impossible to know whether to say what
another person thinks. But we do sometimes say what others think
on the grounds of how they behave. And so - for the metaphysical
behaviorist - it becomes tempting to identify the very meaning of
"thinks" with the behavioral grounds upon which we base our
attributions on this term. The move here consists of identifying the
meaning of the term with the criteria for employing it. Now since it
seems to be the case that our criteria for settling disputes about
what a person thinks in cases where that person's nonverbal
behavior is ambiguous is usually a matter of getting that person to
tell us what he or she thinks, we may wish to hold that such
avowals provide the critical grounds for what thoughts we should
attribute to someone.
Since an avowal oriented theory would trade on the important
status we actually give to what a person says about what he or she
thinks, a means for distinguishing types of avowal orientations will
be to distinguish different kinds of reasons for regarding avowals
as so important.
The most "natural"-sounding reason for giving a person's avowal
such important status would be, I suppose, that these avowals are
reports of inner mental states or occurrences, and that the person
knows best which such occurrences take place within him or her.
But of course this isn't an avowal theory at all; it is a type of
mentalist theory according to which the meaning of "he thinks
such-and-such" consists in having the appropriate
such-and-such-ish thought occurrence or state. The difference is a
matter of what the theorists takes the word "thinks" to mean; but
this can also be brought out by distinguishing "symptom" from
"criterion." The mentalist is holding that what people avow is
characteristically symptomatic of what thoughts they have within.
But an avowal theorist would be maintaining that, given the
appropriate surrounding circumstances, the person's avowal is not
a symptom or indirect clue to what the person thinks, but just is
what the person thinks, hence the criterion for attribution.
A second approach to why avowals are so important might be this:
While it is true that "thinks" refers to behavioral dispositions, each
of us is better acquainted with his or her own behavioral
dispositions and history than anybody else, and is therefore in a
better position to attribute self descriptions about how he or she is
disposed to behave with the language of "I think." "I know what I
think because I spend more time with me than anybody else does."
But again, this is not a bona fide avowal oriented theory. It is an
endorsement of a behavioral orientation. It does not maintain that
the meaning of "she thinks" is a matter of her being prepared to say
"I think," but that it is a matter of how she is disposed to behave,
about which she has the best knowledge, but knowledge of the
same sort as anyone else might have of her.
Notice that a soft-nosed behaviorist, who viewed some kinds of
occurrences such as silent speech to be "contingently private
behavior" which could in principle be public, might subscribe to the
following: When a man says what he thinks, he remarks on how he
is disposed to behave. Part of the behavioral tendencies of his
which he knows about and can draw from happen to be private.
They could be public, but they are not, since he has, for example,
said much only in "silent speech" which he might have said aloud.
(If he had said these things aloud this would provide behavioral
information which everyone could draw from in characterizing his
dispositions.) So when this person says what he thinks he draws
on more information about his observable activities than others
have about him, and also draws on his knowledge of "behavior"
which, it just so happens, only he has access to.
Many philosophers would reject as absurd the suggestion that
when we say what we ourselves think we do so on the basis of
grounds. We don't have grounds or evidence for saying what we
think! We just say it! But I myself do not find this absurd. It seems
to me that there are some uses of "think" which serve to
characterize or describe behavioral tendencies, and that we learn
to apply these uses to ourselves. Of course we do not know about
ourselves quite on the same sorts of observational grounds others
have. I may be aware that I fidget, but you see me do it, and the
difference matters. Yet from the fact that you and I come in
different ways to know how I tend to behave, it does not follow
that we are not both speaking of how I tend to behave when we
speak of what I think.
A better representative of an avowal orientation would be a theory
which portrayed avowals as state-expressive. In contrast to the
mentalist orientation according to which an avowal reports the
existence of an (inner) state or occurrence, this approach would
represent what we say, and where we say "I think," as in some
way apart of what it is to think that thing. There may be differences
about what sort of "way" or "part" this is. One possibility would be
for the theorist to hold that the avowal is a part of the general
package of behavioral tendencies, deserving a special place
because of being the least ambiguous part.
Another possible approach would be to treat the avowal as the
"natural expression" of a state which might have non-public
aspects. For instance, perhaps there is a non-observable
component to what it is to think something, and perhaps it is not
even in principle public and has aspects which are
phenomenologically non-analogous to public behavior; but, public
behavior, especially speech behavior, would "naturally tend" to be
displayed in certain characteristic ways by persons who were in
the state that included that component. This approach resembles
but differs from the mentalist view that "I think . . ." reports the
(inner) presence of a certain thought. For the theory here
considered need not maintain that "I think" means that there is
some inner state, nor partially inner state, nor that it is an attempt
to report such a state. The idea, rather, is that the words are apart
of the state, and "naturally express" it. Similarly: when I am happy I
tend to smile. My smiling is not the same as my being happy, but is
the "natural expression" of it. My smile is not a report about my
being happy, but is expressive of happiness. At least so it is in the
straight-forward case of self-expression. Sometimes I may more
make a point of smiling, and this may be fakery or it may be a
legitimate exaggeration of the state I am in. Then smiling is more
patently a form of communication, but still not a report of an inner
state; it is more a matter of taking on the role of one who is
unqualifiedly happy. By that analogy, to say what I think is not to
report on what is going on inside, but to enter fully (and
spontaneously) the role of one who thinks such things - that being
a public role.
In this last perspective we bring more into focus the fact that
linguistic avowals must be understood not merely as "natural
expressions" but complex practices governed by social
conventions and rules. Of course much human behavior is
convention-governed, but this is so conspicuously and importantly
true of linguistic behavior that it provides a further reason for
distinguishing avowal orientations from other behavioral
orientations. The thesis which emerges can be put this way: The
meaning of "he thinks x" derives from the interconnections between
this linguistic maneuver and the whole complex network of rules
and conventions of what Wittgenstein (1958b) called the "form of
life" in which it is immersed. Partly for this reason, the meaning of
this expression cannot be reduced either to the private referent
claimed by the mentalist, nor to the indefinite list of behavioral
dispositions advocated by the behavioral orientation. The meaning
of "he thinks x" rests on a certain sort of paradigm case in which he
would, under appropriate circumstances, say "I think x." The
conditions for the paradigm must include the man's being a
full-fledged member of the linguistic community, set in a context
free of the sorts of difficulties which would be posed by the need
for either sham or exaggeration. More problematic cases get their
meaning by their parasitic relationship to the paradigms.
In another article (Russell, 1973) 1 have developed a variant of the
avowal orientation in which I compared avowals to what J. L.
Austin (I 962) called "performative speech acts." Performatives
have the quality that, because of surrounding linguistic conventions,
one can make something so just by saying it. I make it so that I
promise when I say the words "I promise," and similarly make a
bet with "I bet," get married with "I do" (in a marriage ceremony),
etc. Here it is a matter of the conventions within the language for
using a certain expression which explains why persons can only
say "I bet" (etc.) for themselves. If saying "I think" is something like
taking a certain stand via linguistic conventions, that would explain
the importance of a person's avowal (without supposing special
access to private states); for a person can take a stand only for
himself or herself. "I think" cannot be a pure performative since,
according to Austin's formulation of that notion, a performative
utterance is to have no truth value. But because parallels between
"I think" and "I promise" are striking, I have urged considering "I
think" a "quasi-performative."
I want to recommend just one more subdivision under the heading
of avowal orientations, and it turns on a pretty subtle nuance.
Earlier I urged considering "he thinks" as meaning "he would say 'I
think'," and presented "I think" as an avowal which is expressive of
what it is to think such-and-such. Now the term "expressive"
carries the suggestion that the words of avowal somehow grow out
of or are a product of a prior condition or state. So viewed, the
avowal "I think" would be the most conspicuous and significant
feature emerging from a different and prior state of thinking. If we
go too far in driving a wedge between that "state" and the avowal
we lose the whole point of the avowal orientation, which was to
identify the meaning of "think" with the avowal. Even short of that,
it may help to distinguish between an expressive avowal orientation
which treats the avowal as an outgrowth, and what I would call a
constitutive analysis which treats the avowal as a (particularly
important) part of what it is to think such-and-such. So viewed, "I
think it is raining" is a constituent (or part) which makes up what it
is to think that it is raining, and this differs from the "expressive
orientation" (slightly, anyway) because it doesn't carry the hint that
the words of avowal somehow emerge from a prior and
distinguishable condition. Here my use of "constituent" is indebted
to an excellent article by Alexander Sesonske (1968), and I have
developed it elsewhere (Russell, 1978a) as a tool for distinguishing
between avowals which are constituent of character traits and
avowals which are constitutive of affect (feeling).
The Map in Outline: What "He Thinks X" Might Mean
I. Mentalist Orientation
"He thinks x" means he has some sort of inner states or
occurrences of a relevant sort, to which he has special access.
(a) Non-analogue version. These mental contents are unlike
anything in the public world, and are not reducible to, e.g., visual
or auditory imagery.
1. These are occurrences or episodes.
2. These are ongoing states.
3. These are dispositions to having (relevant) occurrences or
ongoing states.
(b) Phenomenological analogue version. These mental events
resemble public events; visualizing something is like seeing it, silent
speech is like speaking aloud.
1. Thinking x consists of having these events.
2. Thinking x consists of ongoing states from which these events
emerge.
3. Thinking x consists of dispositions for having such events or
ongoing states.
II. Behavioral Orientation
The meaning of "he thinks x" is to be analyzed into the disposition
to display an indefinite list of relevant sorts of behavior under
relevant circumstances.
(a) Methodological version. For the practical purposes of science,
expressions like "he thinks x" are either not to be used at all, or
else analyzed into behavioral dispositions.
1. This is because such expressions refer to inaccessible events.
(This is really disguised or latent mentalism.)
2 This is because the behavioral dispositions which might unpack
the meaning of "he thinks x" are just too cumbersome for the
scientist to work with.
(b) Metaphysical behaviorism. The meaning of "he thinks x" is to
be analyzed into the disposition to display . . . etc ...
1. Hard-nosed variety. The analysis of "he thinks x" is to employ
reference to only those behaviors which are straight-forwardly
publicly observable.
2. Soft-nosed variety. Certain events which are not
straight-forwardly public behavior, e.g., silent speech, are included
in the list of "behavioral" dispositions which unpack the meaning of
"he thinks x," on the grounds that these could, in principle, be
replaced by straight-forwardly public behavior.
III. Avowal Orientation
For reasons other than those held by the mentalist and the
behaviorally orientated theorist, the leading criterion for saying of a
man "he thinks x" should be that he is prepared to avow "I think
X."
(a) Illegitimate versions of avowal orientations.
1. The reason why the avowal "I think x" is so important is that
each person knows best the contents of his or her own mind. This
is really a mentalist view.
2. The reason why the avowal "I think x" is so important is that
each person is more familiar with his or her own behavior than
anyone else. This is really simply the behavioral orientation.
(b) Versions of avowal orientations.
1. The avowal is part of the general package of relevant behavior,
deserving a special place because it is the least ambiguous part.
2. The avowal is important because of its inter-connections with a
whole "form of life" involving complex linguistic rules and
conventions. "He thinks x" gets its meaning from paradigm cases
where a person would avow "I think x."
a. Avowing "I think x" is to be analyzed as a quasiperformative
speech act.
b. Avowals are constitutive (and not just expressive) of the states
they avow.
Preferences and Conclusions
In this paper I have indicated several objections to the mentalist
orientation to the meaning of "thinks." In my opinion, these
objections should teach us that this orientation does not belong -
so to speak - in the center of our map. I believe that mentalism has
been vastly overrated, but I do not conclude that it has no place on
the map at all. To see that it has been over-rated, to challenge the
supposition that when we talk about what a person thinks we must
thereby commit ourselves to speculations about inherently private
states or occurrences, can be tremendously liberating for the
psychological theorist. For, it seems to me, there are many
theorists in psychology who would like to discuss what people
think but who refrain from doing so on the grounds that such
terminology automatically entails mentalism. We are in a position to
challenge that assumption, and to consider the merits of alternative
perspectives. I do not believe that "he thinks x" always implies that
he has (relevant) states or occurrences which are inherently
accessible only to him. But I believe that we would go too far in
the other direction if we supposed that "thinks" is always and
simply a matter of behavioral and/or avowal dispositions set in a
context of linguistic practices. I see no reason for supposing that
there must be one and only one sort of use for the word "thinks,"
and only one sort of ground rule governing its meaning. And so my
sympathies for the second and third orientations in this paper do
not lead me to conclude that it is never the case that when we
wonder what a person thinks we are wondering what may be
going on "inside" that person. Only, I should say, this is not the
heart of the concept; this does not belong in the center of the map.
Historically we have assumed that mentalism was the heart of the
concept of thinking, and that what a person did and said were to
be regarded as peripheral phenomena. I believe it is the other way
around. The language games with which we attribute thoughts have
their heart and home in what we witness people do. What
understanding we may have of what is either contingently or
inherently private has a derivative and secondary status.
To take one example of how this applies to a psychological theory,
Freud seems to have assumed a mentalistic orientation, and so he
seems to have assumed that what a patient avowed was a clue
about that patient's privately accessible conscious thoughts, while
behavior and verbal slips and free associations were clues about
inner states or occurrences which were equally private, in principle
accessible directly only to the patient, and in fact inaccessible to
the patient as well. Freud would have acknowledged that he was
speculating when he talked about what his patients unconsciously
thought, but he supposed that he was speculating about what was
going on inside them. I believe he was speculating about how his
patient's deeds and historical (but not hidden) antecedents added
up; sometimes this was not speculation, but something approaching
straight-forward description, plain enough for all but the patient to
see.
Since I have urged that mentalism does not belong in the center of
a map of the concept of thinking, the reader might suppose that I
would reserve that spot for an avowal orientation. After all, I have
argued that behavioral dispositions are inherently subject to
differing interpretations, and that avowals typically settle disputes.
However, I do not believe that an avowal orientation can provide
the heart (if there must be a heart) either. I do not believe that a
person's preparedness to avow "I think x" can be essential to an
analysis of "he thinks x." My reasons for this resemble
Wittgenstein's "private language argument' discussed in the earlier
section on objections to mentalism. Recall that Wittgenstein argued
that in order for the use of an expression ("think") to be taught
there must be adequate criterion for determining that the
expression applies, and for deciding whether the child has
mastered its use. This line of reasoning provided an attack on
mentalism. By the same token, it cannot be essential that a child be
prepared to avow "I think x" before we can correctly make the
attribution "you think x," for then we could never be correct in the
cases we were using as our basis of instruction.
I conclude, then, that if there is a center to the map of the concept
of thinking, it is charted by the behavioral orientation; the mentalist
and avowal orientations may encompass rich territories, but they
are more peripheral, and we do well to first familiarize ourselves
with what is more central, the behavioral dispositions which
unpack our language of attributing thought.
I would hope that what I have said might be found relevant to what
psychologists call "attributional" theory. Having endorsed a
behavioral orientation to the meaning of "thinks" I would want to
underscore what I remarked parenthetically early in this paper, that
what I have called a behavioral orientation is by no means to be
confused with what psychologists call "behaviorism." In the first
place, I would regard myself as a "soft nosed metaphysical
behaviorist": I would want to include (but not stress) events like
silent speech, which happen to be (contingently) private and yet
could, in principle, be replaced by public events, among the
"behavior" which I regard as relevant to the concept of thinking. In
the second place, in much of the psychological literature on
attribution theory and on behaviorism there is a commitment to a
causal perspective which I regard as opaque and fundamentally
muddled. I have explained my sympathies for an existentialist
viewpoint elsewhere (Russell, 1978b, 1979). 1 do believe that
human behavior is explainable and predictable; I do not believe
that this entails anything at all about causality, nor do I believe that
what is profound in attribution theory need have any association
with the causal language with which it has become ill-wed. I have
hinted in this essay that the ordinary language notion of thinking is
rooted in phenomena accessible to the social scientist, and is a
useful and valuable tool to employ in the work of explaining human
actions. I should add my opinion that a fuller understanding of the
concept of thinking would require a much larger map which
pointed out interdependencies between this concept and several
others in the same family, such as "action...... intention," "desire,"
and "choose." When such a map is drawn I believe it will show
that the concept of causality never had any coherent place on it,
but this claim takes me well beyond the scope of the present
paper.
References
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Russell, J. M. Sartre's theory of sexuality. Journal of Humanistic
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Articles published